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Globalization has been both heralded and decried, celebrated and debated. 
The critical discussion is often about the dynamics of global capital mobility 
and the power of transnational corporations, with the focus usually on capital-
driven changes in global cultures or on the plight of labor in international wage 
competition. In contrast, the argument I present here looks away from corpora-
tions and technologies and points to globalization as referring to certain politi-
cal strategies to resolve the crisis of the capitalist state. I stress two organizing 
dimensions of this strategy: the process of globalization includes a set of spatial 
rearrangements, and, second, space is reconfigured through race and gender for-
mation. My contention is that, far from signaling a dimunition of boundaries, 
globalization more often than not reinforces and fortifies geo-political and ra-
cial borders. 
I pursue this argument by bringing together two distanced but strongly con-
nected spaces in North America: the inner city and the borderlands. By explor-
ing the formation of these spaces in the era of global capital, the connections 
between them will demonstrate my thesis that undergirding globalization is a 
spatial strategy that relies on the interfacing of race and gender processes. The 
focus here is on those people and communities on whose backs the global politi-
cal economy is built. From this perspective, then, urban (re-)development and 
the politics of global capital on the international frontier between Mexico and 
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the U.S. are processes by which poor people of color experience displacement, 
violence, and marginalization. These processes are key to understanding how 
global restructuring aims to resolve the crisis of the capitalist state by managing 
race and gender difference. 
I begin by charting the contours of the capitalist state's current crisis, or 
what Toni Negri has called the "crisis-state."1 This discussion provides the cru-
cial context for interpreting how globalization plays out in the city and in the 
borderlands. I then turn to each of these two spaces to specify the state's strate-
gies in the face of crisis. In terms of the inner city, I look to the dynamics of 
gentrification, urban restructuring, and changes in the welfare state as examples 
of how boundaries within the city are drawn based upon race and access to capi-
tal. Regarding the borderlands, I use the development of the Border Industrial-
ization Program to explain how a similar process takes place on the U.S.-Mexico 
frontier. My aim in piecing together these distanced spaces is twofold: first, to 
make globalization more understandable as a political process with similar con-
sequences in diverse locations, and second, to draw out the social violence that 
accompanies this process. By "social violence," I mean those delimitations of 
human possibility produced on a social scale and legitimated by recognized au-
thority: for example, the poverty, exploitation, and death that are productive of 
the political economy.2 Gentrification and border industrialization are mecha-
nisms of social violence against workers and communities, and by demonstrat-
ing the basis for this violence in the state's efforts to resolve the crisis of capital 
and difference, these diverse locations will come closer together. 
Gentrification in U.S. cities and the structural changes occurring in the bor-
derlands and other export processing zones do not form an identity because they 
evince identical conditions of existence. Rather, I argue that the articulation of 
these disparate spaces comprises a complex formation featuring structured rela-
tions of dominance and subordination between its parts. In this argument I place 
gentrification within the larger dynamic we have come to term "globalization" 
in order to reveal the dialectical relations of development and underdevelop-
ment that produce gentrification and border industrialization as different levels 
of the same social formation dedicated to capital accumulation. Throughout this 
argument I endeavor to show how economic relations of production are never 
simply economic; race, gender, and space are intrinsic to the way in which the 
global political economy produces subjects structured in dominance.3 
The Crisis-State and Globalization 
The state is a complex, fractured, often contradictory, site of institutions. 
The state is generally depicted as it represents itself—as a benign entity serving 
the greater public good. John Comaroff, in his analysis of the colonial state, 
points to an important dimension of the representation of modern bourgeois 
democratic states. The excesses of the state, the inequities and dominations, 
Comaroff says, "are typically treated as aberrations, as ruptures in an otherwise 
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seamless narrative of progress. And they are, by and large, blamed not on the 
systemic contradictions of colonialism itself, or on any kind of structural con-
sideration, but on misanthropic or misguided individuals."4 The kinds of vio-
lence, abuse, and corruption either perpetrated by the state or sanctioned by its 
institutions are thus treated as anomalies. 
Marxism has tended to equate the state with political domination, in the 
sense that the state is merely a class dictatorship.5 Yet, although the state's activ-
ity reaches into all spheres of everyday life, these functions cannot be reduced to 
domination alone. Critical treatments that attempt to move beyond the notion of 
the state as a mere appendage of the dominant class often simply reproduce this 
image by proposing a dual-nature version of the state. In this explanation, the 
essence of the state is found in its purely technical functions that exist outside of 
class struggle (e.g., administration of laws, provision of education, regulation of 
commerce); the second nature of the state, depicted as "just a question of habit," 
does have a class nature, perverting or contaminating the functions of the first, 
true nature.6 In contrast, Greek social theorist Nicos Poulantzas posits a theory 
of the state that understands both the centrality of domination to state power, as 
well as its limits. The state, writes Poulantzas, 
really does exhibit a peculiar material framework that can by 
no means be reduced to mere political domination. The state 
apparatus—that special and hence formidable something—is 
not exhausted in state power. Rather political domination is 
itself inscribed in the institutional materiality of the State. Al-
though the State is not created ex nihilo by the ruling classes, 
nor is it simply taken over by them: state power (that of the 
bourgeoisie, in the case of the capitalist State) is written into 
the materiality. Thus, while all the State's actions are not re-
ducible to political domination, their composition is neverthe-
less marked by it.7 
For Poulantzas, political domination is imbricated into the very forms of the 
state that people experience: for example, public assistance offices, schools, 
police, courts, and prisons. In the situation of liberal capitalism, then, while the 
state is not simply or always serving capital's needs, the interests of capital are 
frequently expressed through these material forms of the state, 
The role of the state in shaping racial domination flows from this analysis 
of state power. Insofar as concepts of liberty and equality are fundamental to the 
liberal nation-state, racialization poses problems for the state by revealing deep 
historical contradictions with the universalistic aspirations of Enlightenment 
ideology. As David Goldberg observes, the more explicitly universal liberalism's 
commitments, "the more open it is to and the more determined it is by the likes 
of racial subjectivity and racist exclusivity."8 The modern nation-state is thus 
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characterized by an "unstable equilibrium of the denial and universalization" of 
racial and sexual difference.9 The contradiction at the core of modern liberal 
democracy is the denial of difference and the simultaneous universalization of 
difference.10 The racial and sexual characterizations produced from this contra-
diction help define liberalism and therefore the state as well. The raced and 
gendered failures and excesses of the modern nation-state are bound up in insti-
tutional, political, and cultural practices with expressions of equality and liberty, 
property, and individual self-possession to form the crucial conflicts in political 
community life today.11 
The "crisis" of the liberal capitalist state emanates not only from the race 
and gender contradictions inherent to modernity, but also from the contradic-
tions that characterize capital accumulation. This crisis has its origins in the late 
1960s, at the end of the long upward movement in the rate of profit that marked 
the end of the golden age of U.S. capitalism.12 A basic necessity of capitalist 
society is near-constant economic expansion—the pursuit of larger and larger 
quantities of capital.13 As a result of economic recessions and transformations in 
the economy, U.S. businesses experienced a 50 percent drop in average profit 
rates between 1965 and the late-1970s.14 This profit crisis helped bring about 
the end of what has been variously called "military Keynesianism" or the "war-
fare-welfare state": the broad post-war economic project consisting of invest-
ments designed to avoid the cumulative effects of downward business cycles by 
guaranteeing effective demand during downturns.15 While the social project of 
Keynesianism included protections for workers against unemployment, follow-
ing on the belief that full employment of resources encourages rather than limits 
the production of new wealth, it was first and foremost a safety net for capital.16 
With the fall in profits, however, corporations began to resist their contributions 
to the "social wage," and embarked on a series of tax revolts leading to the 
dismantling of the Keynesian economic project in the early-1970s. 
The notion of "crisis" is politically neutral in the sense that objectively it 
simply connotes a situation of impending or current change.17 The direction of 
change is determined through struggle; crises, themselves, are thus neither "good" 
nor "bad," but merely describe conditions of political contestation. The crisis in 
modernity presented by racial and sexual exclusions combined with the eco-
nomic crisis of capital's tax revolt produced a profound struggle over the role of 
the U.S. state. This struggle has resulted in a deep crisis in the social contract. 
The ensuing "crisis-state" is characterized by a dramatic redefinition of state 
involvement and accountability in political, social, and economic life. The basic 
characteristic of the crisis-state is the "total rupture of any balance or propor-
tionality between the struggles and needs of the proletariat on the one hand, and 
capitalist development on the other."18 This rupture means a shift to a new rela-
tion of power, towards the interests of capital, and away from democratic pro-
cess.19 The result is an indelible change in the ways in which the state registers 
social conflict at the political level. As Avery Gordon expansively observes, 
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our country's major institutions—the corporation, the law, the 
state, the media, the public—recognize narrower and narrower 
evidence for the harms and indignities that citizens and resi-
dents experience. The most obvious violations—the poverty, 
the gaping inequalities of resources, the brutality of the po-
lice, the corruption of democratic politics, the hunger and 
homelessness, the hateful beatings and batterings—are every-
where to be seen only in the disappearing hypervisibility of 
their fascinating anomalousness.20 
Gordon is describing the disinvestment of public institutions from the social 
contract and the institutionalizing of the state's transformation in a manner com-
mensurate with a specific political form, the crisis-state. 
The features of the crisis-state include the restructuring of the economy 
away from productive investment towards monetary policies, the devolution of 
welfare, and the enhancement of repressive forces in the form of military build-
up and increases in spending on policing and incarceration. The state's auster-
ity-based program implies as its corollary the extension of new techniques of 
coercive state intervention in society at large. Changes in public spending such 
as the transfer of resources from higher education to prisons, the cutting of so-
cial services, and the use of punishment and surveillance as investment opportu-
nities (as represented by the "industrial complex" of corporate, administrative, 
and political interests that converge on the prison system, border patrol, and 
private property security) demonstrate how the state takes the problems of capi-
tal as problems of its own.21 These features of the crisis-state are designed to 
resolve the social, political, and economic crisis; they also constitute the guiding 
components of globalization. 
Since the early- 1970's, the rising dominance of capital and the reduction of 
the state's commitment to balancing the costs to workers of capital production is 
apparent in indicators of inequality, wage erosion, and sectoral shifts in the 
economy. The 1970s saw a rapidly accelerating decline in traditional, highly 
unionized, high-wage manufacturing jobs. The growth of the high-technology-
manufacturing, craft-specialty, and advanced service sectors of the economy 
throughout the 1980s coincided with the combination of downsizing, capital 
flight out of the inner cities to regions of the country or to nations providing less 
expensive labor pools, and the introduction of labor-replacing technology. These 
structural changes in the economy led to high unemployment and depressed real 
average wages. During one indicative year in this process of large-scale job loss 
due to sectoral shifts, approximately 400,000 U.S. workers lost their jobs in 
1979 alone because of plant closings or relocations.22 After the early-1980s, the 
percentage of total displaced workers who come from the manufacturing sector 
still continues to outpace the industry's share of overall employment; this down-
ward trend signals the ongoing decline of the sector as a source of viable work. 
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From January 1997 through December 1999,7.6 million workers were displaced 
from their jobs because their plant or company closed or moved, there was in-
sufficient work for them to do, or their position or shift was abolished.23 
A central strategy by corporations to recoup lost profits and capitalize on 
new technological developments is the employment of part-time or temporary 
labor. This business strategy has important repercussions for workers, especially 
without a welfare safety net available. One historical watermark occurred in 
1992 when fully half of all new jobs were for temporary, subcontracted work.24 
Typically, this contingent labor force works in the burgeoning low-end service 
sector for low wages, accrues no seniority, enjoys few benefits, and undermines 
organized labor. A parallel process is the pursuit of less expensive, non-union-
ized foreign labor, either by investing overseas, importing less expensive for-
eign parts, subcontracting to smaller firms locally and abroad, or actually im-
porting low-wage foreign labor.25 
Much is made of the booming economy and falling rates of unemployment 
between 1993 and 2000.26 While people may be working, they are still in pov-
erty. Of the 36.4 million people living below the official poverty line in 1995, 
7.2 million were employed more than half the year and about 60 percent of 
these worked full-time.27 There were over 4 million families in poverty, even 
though one or more members worked for at least half the year.28 Other esti-
mates put the number of working poor at 30 million and the full-time, year-
round working poor at 7 million.29 The share of the population with working 
family members has increased since 1993. In 2000, a greater percentage of the 
poor had one full-time worker than in 1993 (44.5 percent vs. 36.0 percent). 
Therefore, although people with working family members are somewhat less 
likely to be poor in 2000 compared with 1993, the poor are more likely to come 
from working families.30 The cumulative result of the structural changes in the 
economy is that for the first time in history, U.S. society has been experiencing 
continuous economic growth and rising poverty and income disparity for full-
time workers.31 
Economic growth has traditionally reduced poverty rates and increased the 
share of income garnered by the poorest families, but this was not the case in the 
otherwise prosperous 1980s and 1990s: in 1989, after six years of sustained 
economic growth, the national poverty rate stood at 12.8 percent.32 In 1991, 
31.2 percent of full-time workers earned less than the poverty line, which has 
increased by 30 percent since 1973.33 The 2000 census revealed a reduction in 
the poverty rate to 11.3 percent nationally; this rate rises to over twenty percent 
for blacks and Latinos, however, and continues to rise the more specific you get 
by age, race, gender, and geographic location.34 In the U.S. in 1999, one out of 
five children was being raised in poverty, and while three-fourths of the working 
poor are white, poverty rates for blacks and Latinos are two and three times 
higher, respectively, than the rate for whites, and women are more likely to earn 
poverty-level wages than men.35 
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Declining real wages and increasing earning disparity are major reasons 
why workers remain mired in poverty despite constant economic growth. Real 
hourly wages for all employees fell by 12 percent between 1973 and 1990 and 
remained flat throughout the "boom" of the 1990s; the median family of four 
earned the same real income in 1996 as in 1973, while working more hours; the 
wealth of the bottom 40 percent fell by half from 1983 to 1992 while that of the 
top 20 percent grew by one-fifth.36 A 1998 study estimated that 46 percent of the 
jobs with the most growth between 1994 and 2005 pay less than $16,000 a year— 
wages that will not lift families out of poverty.37 Moreover, 74 percent of these 
jobs pay below a livable wage ($32,185 for a family of four).38 Although real 
wages grew at all levels from 1997 through the end of the century, these in-
creases have not counteracted the history of stagnant and declining wages from 
the early-1970s. Had the average wage continued to grow after 1973 at the rate 
it did from 1947 to 1973, workers in 1992 would have earned $19 an hour in-
stead of $10.56, a difference of more than $17,000 for full-time workers.39 As it 
is, however, the real value of the minimum wage in 1997 was 18.1 percent less 
than in 1979.40 
Official unemployment and poverty rates can be misleading if we miss the 
specifics. In the growth economy, almost all new jobs are in the service sector, 
where contingent employment is most likely to occur.41 Almost a quarter of the 
workforce (32 million) is now employed in temporary, part-time work.42 While 
part-time work can be good for some workers by offering flexibility, it can also 
be a form of disguised unemployment. This picture of poverty and part-time 
labor indicates that contingent work is predominantly an employer, not an em-
ployee, preference. Part-time work becomes a trap that makes it virtually impos-
sible to work oneself out of poverty. Moreover, the persistence of hand labor in 
the retail and service sectors, rather than laborsaving machines, simply demon-
strates that employers have calculated the comparative advantages of employing 
direct labor to investing in large-scale technology. Labor in these industries is 
therefore a form of disguised unemployment, or underemployment.43 
The end of welfare entitlements and the requirement of workfare are forc-
ing increasing numbers of poor families into this constricted labor market. Re-
placing welfare with workfare is an example of the crisis-state's withdrawal of 
support from labor and acquiescence to capital. The welfare reform laws "regu-
late a reserve army of surplus labor that keeps in check the minimum wage rate 
and thus the wage profile of the low-end service sector."44 The new legislation, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), was enacted in August 1996; 
states were permitted to begin implementation almost immediately and were 
required to begin no later than July 1, 1997. Within the first year and a half of 
TANF, the nation's welfare caseload dropped 27 percent. The reasons for the 
decline are contested in the literature, but it appears indisputable that the new 
legislation has produced an increase in employment entries among the poor— 
into jobs that do not provide sufficient wages for families to reach the poverty 
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line, even though earnings were high enough to make them ineligible for TANF 
assistance.45 
The restructuring of the economy around finance and service industries, the 
erosion of the low-skill wage profile, and the devolution of welfare are key fea-
tures of the crisis-state. Race and gender are central to this picture of the crisis-
state. Blacks and Latinos are disproportionately represented among the poor, 
among workers displaced from downsizing sectors of the economy, and among 
former welfare recipients forced into low-wage labor. It cannot be overstated 
that the crisis-state's reproduction of the class relations of capitalism directly 
targets the raced and gendered working poor. The crisis produced by capital's 
tax revolt and the ensuing dismantling of Keynesianism beginning in the early-
1970s was blamed not on social disinvestment and shifts in the productive sec-
tors of the economy, but rather on the "failures" of social expenditures. The U.S. 
corporate right charged that the social programs of the 1960's produced welfare 
state policies that "overreached realistic possibilities for reform, overloaded the 
state, rewarded free-riders, and undermined authority, civic morality, and labor 
discipline."46 In other words, capital sought to reinvigorate a flattened profit-
rate in this period by reducing its contribution to the "social wage," and yet 
social welfare programs and their constituents were blamed for the ensuing anxi-
ety and upheaval. The increased economic uncertainty helped focus public an-
tipathy on government spending for social programs. In this way, people nega-
tively affected by the state's divestment from social welfare were convinced to 
actually promote the celebration of social program cutbacks. 
The winning of support by individuals for policies inimical to their material 
needs is made possible through racist culture. Building on the insight that it is 
through culture that we make sense of the world, David Goldberg notes the role 
of racism in organizing cultural life: "Racist culture has been one of the central 
ways modern social subjects make sense of and express themselves about the 
world they inhabit and invent; it has been key in their responding to the world 
they conjointly make."47 Racism permits the reconfiguration of actual power 
relations that present whites, the wealthy, and males as "victims" of the unfair 
advantages purportedly secured by people of color, the poor, and women.48 Poor 
whites would not consent to marginalization by a punitive welfare state were it 
not that "welfare" and "public assistance" have come to signify racial otherness, 
particularly blackness. The pervasive stereotype of welfare continues to be the 
image of the single, black, drug-addicted mother—the "welfare queen." The 
case of the former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke's 1991 gubernatorial bid in 
Louisiana illustrates how racism drives this process. Duke campaigned on a pledge 
to reduce the numbers of blacks on welfare by cutting benefits and by offering 
women a monetary bonus to use Norplant, a controversial injectable contracep-
tive that prevents pregnancy for up to five years by gradually releasing a low 
dose of a synthetic hormone into the bloodstream.49 One white woman explained 
that, although she relied on welfare herself, she voted for Duke because "blacks 
just have those babies and go on welfare."50 
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Not only are welfare and poverty raced and gendered in this way, but the 
crisis-state's move to reduce the security to labor and to enhance the returns to 
capital are attempts to empty the state of its racial and sexual make-up in that the 
social programs that have been targeted by capital for divestment have become 
identified with women and people of color. Its detractors argued that the state 
had become too closely aligned with particularistic interests. Although advo-
cates of neoliberal and laissez-faire economic models reject the idea that the 
crises of race and gender exclusions have contributed to the current composition 
of the crisis-state, the interfacing of race and gender difference with the subordi-
nation of labor is the defining feature of the dislocations described above, of the 
political strategy embedded in global restructuring. Capitalism proceeds on the 
basis of differentiation but pretends to create equality and uniformity. I turn now 
to the city and to the borderlands to explore the ways this political strategy is 
manifested spatially. 
The City 
U.S. cities have been shaped historically by residential, occupational, and 
educational segregation, and by urban planning in which creating landscapes for 
capital accumulation has not been effectively counter-balanced by public inter-
ests. The suburban swell, especially in the post-World War II era, that pulled 
whites out of inner cities led to new levels of spatial segregation in the metropo-
lis. The desire by these suburban communities to be fiscally and politically au-
tonomous of deteriorating and racially identified cities led to the proliferation of 
local governments, a condition described as "metropolitan political fragmenta-
tion."51 By 1990, fourteen cities with a population larger than 100,000 had a 
majority black population, eleven more had black populations of between 40 
and 50 percent, and 40 cities larger than 25,000 had majority black popula-
tions.52 And by 2000, the central cities were 53.1 percent black and 21.2 percent 
white, while the metropolitan areas outside of the inner cities were 34.9 percent 
black and 56.2 percent white.53 The political organization of urban space into 
multiple jurisdictions segregated by race leaves U.S. cities with serious distribu-
tional inequalities in terms of the spatial location of problems and the location of 
fiscal resources needed to solve these problems. In this way, segregation is a 
totalizing condition: since resource availability determines educational opportu-
nity, and thus jobs, and thus quality of housing, segregation in one area of social 
life tends to require and produce segregation in every area.54 
The outcome of this segregation is that urban politics in the U.S. is intensely 
geographical and spatial, as interest groups move to maximize and preserve the 
positive effects around their homes or businesses, or minimize the negative im-
pacts of surrounding community effects on their property values.55 As the site of 
many competing interests, then, the notion that the state is a neutral agent in 
urban politics rings hollow. The state as the source of more or less consis-
tent progress can be heard in narratives about "growth" in certain cities or 
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neighborhoods, as if gentrification and redevelopment, although painful, were 
natural, organic, and inevitable—i.e., growing up can be rough at times, but 
ultimately good. This discourse is related to the traditional liberal conception of 
historical and national progress, with its narratives of conquest and cultivation 
of the "frontier."56 It also reflects the ideology of laissez-faire capitalism, which 
insists that social conflicts will be mediated through the market. However, what 
is usually called "growth," urban critic Mike Davis has noted, is "neither a purely 
natural metabolism (as neoliberals imagine the marketplace to be) nor an en-
lightened volition (as politicians and planners like to claim)."57 
The racial segregation of central cities persists in new forms in the political 
economy of the crisis-state. I focus here upon the new spatial economies of 
globalization that play out in the form of urban gentrification. The spatially frag-
mented manufacturing process has intensified the spatial concentration of fi-
nance in cities, increased the demand on service industries, spurred the profit-
ability of the real estate industry, and escalated the connection between racial 
segregation and the affordable housing emergency.58 
In the process known as "gentrification," the real estate and finance indus-
tries capitalize on urban areas as sites for surplus value through a continual pro-
cess of destroying and rebuilding. Under the guise of "revitalizing" neighbor-
hoods, the real estate industry withdraws investment from one location in order 
to reinvest elsewhere. The perversity of the real estate market is such that land-
lords benefit going out and coming back in: they pocket the money they with-
held from repairs and upkeep, and then having created dilapidated buildings, 
they now have the conditions for a new round of capital reinvestment.59 
Gentrification has occurred simultaneously with the sectoral switch to capi-
tal investment and is symptomatic of the larger crisis in the capitalist state de-
scribed in the first section of this paper. The disinvestment in central cities that 
marked the rise of the suburbs created an ideal location for new financial invest-
ments in the urban built environment. We can place the beginning of the disin-
vestment in the older inner-city neighborhoods with the Federal Housing Act of 
1934 that channeled most of the new government-backed loans towards white 
home buyers moving into segregated suburbs and away from communities of 
color throughout the post-World War II period.60 In capital's search for a fix to 
the profit crisis, financial capital flowed into the inner cities. As the Federal 
Housing Agency and the federal highway building projects facilitated 
suburbanization, urban renewal programs in the 1950s and 1960s proceeded to 
destroy residential housing in the inner-cities. Although urban renewal programs 
were ostensibly designed to increase the housing opportunities of lower-income 
residents, 90 percent of the low-income units removed for urban renewal during 
the program's entire history were never replaced, with commercial and indus-
trial projects occupying almost all of the land cleared by the renewal projects.61 
The capital reinvestments in the central cities brought by urban renewal pro-
grams came to include residential redevelopment as the old neighborhoods be-
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gan to gentrify in the 1960s and 1970s.62 In this way, redevelopment of the cities 
may be a geographical reversal, but it demonstrates economic continuity with 
the forces and relations of suburbanization in that both gentriflcation and 
suburbanization function as substantial engines of profit.63 
According to the discourse of gentriflcation, the process revitalizes neigh-
borhoods. In actuality, what is revitalized is simply the profit rate; the process is 
disastrous for the traditional residents of targeted communities. The 1979 An-
nual Housing Survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) found that approximately 500,000 households—possibly 
amounting to as many as two million people—were displaced by gentriflcation 
each year.64 The withdrawal of state assistance in housing has led to increasing 
privatization of housing, contributing to the gentriflcation process: 86 percent of 
the aforementioned 500,000 households were displaced by private-market ac-
tivity, and they are predominantly urban working class.65 
The role of the crisis-state in encouraging gentriflcation should not be missed. 
Real estate laws favorable to developers allow them to profit from both their 
intentional dilapidation of buildings, as well as from the investment opportuni-
ties offered by the rehabilitated property. The profits of private industry are in 
this way dependent upon favorable relationships in the political economy. We 
can see a similar disposition from federal budget expenditures: in 2000, low-
income housing assistance had declined to $24.6 billion, while the cost to the 
Federal Treasury for homeowner tax deductions (and other minor tax expendi-
tures) had skyrocketed to $121.1 billion. The federal investment in housing is 
thus dramatically inequitable and starkly bifurcated; the more expensive one's 
mortgage is, the bigger one's tax break.66 
Urban displacement is intimately connected to the raced and gendered im-
pact of the restructuring economy. The persistence of underemployment (which 
includes the unemployed, the involuntary part-time employed, and those who 
have given up looking for employment) and the decline in wages have put de-
cent housing out of reach for many workers. In 2000, the national median hous-
ing wage for a two-bedroom apartment at the Fair Market Rent, weighted by 
Census 2000 population figures, was $13.87 an hour, more than twice the fed-
eral minimum wage of $5.15 per hour.67 In the median state a minimum-wage 
worker would have to work 83 hours each week to afford a two-bedroom apart-
ment at 30 percent of his or her income, which is the federal definition of afford-
able housing.68 The number of poor renters remains static or increases, while the 
number of affordable places to live diminishes. Between 1993 and 1995 there 
was a loss of 900,000 rental units affordable to very low income families (below 
50 percent of the local area median), a reduction of nine percent; an even greater 
reduction—16 percent—occurred in the same period for the extremely poor, 
those renters with incomes below 30 percent of area median.69 The intervening 
years have seen this situation exacerbated. The loss of housing includes the 
destruction of single-room occupancy (SRO) housing. Consequently, not 
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only are the poor largely working, but because of insufficient wages and the 
gentrification-inflated values of their residences, they are also becoming home-
less: a 1998 survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors of 30 U.S. cities found 
that almost one in five homeless persons is employed, with significantly higher 
percentages in other cities and states.70 
In considering the racial specifics of gentrification it is necessary to recog-
nize the relationship between displacee and displacer. The conditions and direc-
tion of gentrification are undergirded by the logic of capital accumulation, mean-
ing that the process cannot be reduced to the behavior of individuals, no matter 
how purposive and powerful they may be. Nevetheless, it is equally important to 
note that gentrifiers are not mere bearers of a process determined independently 
of them; they are integral to the definition of gentrification itself.71 The charac-
teristics of the displacer, as certain types of workers and as people with particu-
lar racial identifications and socio-economic lifestyles, is as central to the pro-
duction of gentrification as is the redevelopment of the dwellings they come to 
occupy. In other words, inner city neighborhoods are ripe for capital investment 
and redevelopment not for simple economic reasons alone, but precisely be-
cause of who lives there presently and who will live there after gentrification 
takes place. The opportunity for investment would not exist if patterns of racial 
segregation, unequal resource allocation (based on race), and uneven develop-
ment (impacted by race) did not already prevail. Furthermore, gentrification is 
financially lucrative to a range of industries because it capitalizes on the racial 
construction of capital investment—meaning that capital is not a thing but rather 
a social relation that has contingencies in a manner similar (but different) to 
racial difference.72 Gentrification is an instance that reveals the ways in which 
the meanings of race on the one hand, and capital on the other, are constructed 
interdependently. 
This conception of race and economic development is related to a particular 
vision of race and social space. Gentrification participates in a reification of race 
by linking the environmental problems poor people of color face to racial iden-
tity, thereby simply overlooking the realities of the political economy. The in-
strumental explanation of space maintains that the built environment and the 
city itself are merely functional forms whose meaning and purpose are given by 
the use to which they are put. This functionary view of space obscures the poli-
tics that give it its shape and imbue it with meaning, as well as the role of space 
in shaping politics. This instrumental perspective of space encourages two prob-
lematic conclusions regarding the relationship between people and the spaces in 
which they live. Because space is divorced from its social production, it be-
comes independent and understood as functionally empty until acted upon. This 
understanding of space leads to the argument that run-down neighborhoods are 
dilapidated because of the people who occupy them. The policy remedy here is 
to remove the residents in order to "revitalize" the neighborhood. The second 
view maintains that the built environment exercises control over the people who 
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inhabit it, which leads to the policy of "slum clearance," the basis of the urban 
renewal programs. We have seen this process occur in various cities around the 
world throughout history, including recently the leveling of Chicago's Cabrini 
Green housing projects. Notice that both policy remedies—the construction of 
what historian Arnold Hirsch has characterized as the "second ghetto" and its 
subsequent destruction—are potentially lucrative to real estate developers since 
they require the redevelopment of the space.73 
The narrative of urban decay and decline is founded in these notions of 
space. Positing "growth" or "revitalization" as a remedy for decay contorts real-
ity and history. Since gentrification produces homelessness as part of a larger 
restructuring, we are essentially being asked to believe that the housing crisis 
can be cured only by encouraging its causes.74 However, gentrification narra-
tives do more than simply obscure reality; they participate in the construction of 
racial identities. The "ideological siting of decline," as Robert Beauregard calls 
the association of decay and degeneracy with urbanization,75 is produced by and 
participates in the formation of racial identities. Representing poverty and slum 
conditions as the effect of factors present in the physical spaces to which pov-
erty is segregated essentializes space by separating it from dynamics in the po-
litical economy. Additionally, it stands in for what is a series of racisms, one of 
which conflates race with space. In this sense, then, we can see a reification of 
space that mirrors the reification of race.76 
Gentrification is one practice through which the crisis-state reproduces spa-
tial segregation in the central city. This process is a prominent feature of the 
crisis-state's political strategy to recoup profits and subordinate labor and racial 
difference. I turn now to the borderlands as a related space where this practice 
occurs. 
Borderlands 
The case of the Border Industrialization Program demonstrates how the state 
is both the vehicle for globalization and the legitimator of new economic activ-
ity through the production of legality. The termination of the Bracero Program 
by the U.S. government in 1964 exacerbated problems in Mexico. Unemploy-
ment rates along the border approached 50 percent as Mexican workers dis-
placed from U.S. markets resettled along the border.77 At this time, U.S. multi-
nationals were increasing off-shore production operations, principally in Asia. 
The Mexican government successfully recruited U.S. companies to the border-
lands and the two governments produced the Border Industrialization Program 
(BIP) in 1965. Mexico attracted firms to investment opportunities in its country 
because of lower wages and the proximity to the United States. However, the 
U.S. government ensured the success of the BIP by means of two provisions in 
tariff legislation. U.S. trade law items "permit the basing of import duties on 
the value added outside the United States when the products are not substan-
tially altered in character by manufacturing activities in foreign countries."78 
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Subsequent tariff amendments further encouraged the expansion of foreign sub-
sidiary operations by providing tax loopholes for articles assembled abroad for 
export that have not been altered in their identity, advanced in value, or im-
proved in condition except by being assembled.79 These legal provisions spurred 
the growth of the maquiladoras (low-wage manufacturing plants), especially— 
at least initially—in the electronics and apparel manufacturing industries that 
consist almost entirely of assembly procedures. For example, Audio-Mex, a 
subsidiary of a large U.S. company that manufactures a range of electronics 
products, was one of the first of these maquilas to move into the industrial 
parks near the border.80 A typical electronics company operating in the border 
town of Mexicali, Audio-Mex assembled eight-track magnetic tapes and cas-
settes with parts manufactured outside of Mexico and brought to the plant for 
assembly. U.S. trade laws would only tax the company for the value-added to 
the product since manufacturing processes outside of the United States did not 
alter its parts. 
The transnational economic space of the borderlands also was created through 
efforts by the Mexican government. The benefits and flexibility of maquiladoras 
stem from their privileged positions in the host nations. Mexico permitted the 
duty-free importation of machinery, equipment, and raw materials on the condi-
tion that everything produced was exported.81 Permit applications and fees for 
imports underwent major simplification. Restrictions on foreign firms owning 
land has been relaxed and plants operating under the BIP have been granted 100 
percent foreign control over investment so long as their total production is ex-
ported—an extraordinary measure considering that under "normal" circumstances 
foreign investment in Mexico is only permitted, at most, a 49 percent share.82 
With the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
in 1994, the allowances for foreign ownership, investment, and production were 
further enhanced. 
According to the Mexican and U.S. governments, the stated objective of the 
BIP was to reduce unemployment and stem immigration from Mexico to the 
United States. That it has proven extremely profitable for multinational firms 
and for governments as well, while realizing the direct opposite of its employ-
ment and immigration goals, reveals an important dimension of global capital-
ism: the need for high unemployment. Excess in the supply of labor is created 
through the economic dependency of Mexico on U.S. investments (uneven de-
velopment) and by the particular employment practices of firms. For instance, 
one reason why the BIP did not re-employ the displaced workers from the Bracero 
Program is that firms ended up targeting women for work in the factories, thereby 
virtually doubling the post-Bracero labor market because prior to the BIP women 
were either excluded or did not participate in the mainstream labor market.83 
Its proponents claimed that NAFTA would help Mexico by ushering inter-
national capital investment into the country, thereby invigorating economic growth 
and stimulating wages for the Mexican worker. The jobs created by the foreign 
investment generated by NAFTA would leave little reason for Mexican workers 
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to migrate to the U.S. simply for higher wages.84 U.S. corporations and labor 
would thus both benefit from free trade: the former from enhanced investment 
opportunities and the latter from the reduced competition from immigrant labor. 
As Robert Manning and Anita Butera reported in the recent American Studies 
special issue on globalization, however, this assumption has not been realized in 
the post-NAFTA regime: "The initial six years of NAFTA have been character-
ized by economic volatility that has reduced real wages and thus reinforced the 
'rational' behavior of Mexican workers to seek employment in the stable labor 
market of the United States."85 Manning and Butera accordingly document sharp 
increases in the number of Mexicans migrating to the U.S. after the enactment 
of NAFTA. 
The conditions for workers in export processing zones like those created by 
the BIP are proportionately similar to those faced by workers in U.S. cities. In 
Mexican border industrial cities and other export processing zones like Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic, the legal or market wage rate is considerably less 
than a "living wage." In Port-au-Prince, where unemployment runs to 70 per-
cent, a worker will spend her entire daily earnings of $2.40 on the cost of trans-
portation and food before returning home.86 Contrary to popular belief, the cost 
of living in places like Haiti is not commensurate with the local wage rates, 
which is 28 cents an hour in Haiti. Seventy percent of what Haiti consumes has 
to be imported, the consequences of transforming the economy into a "free trade" 
export processing zone, making food as expensive in Haiti as in the United 
States.87 
In Matamoros, Mexico, a typical maquiladora worker will work grueling 
double shifts of 15 hours a day, earn a daily salary of $7.43, or 92 cents an hour, 
and still not be able to make ends meet.88 As a result, most women workers must 
take odd jobs peddling various wares, scavenge for recyclables at the city dump, 
or sell their bodies. In Juarez, Mexico, wages in the maquiladoras rose by 50 
percent from 1995-97, but inflation increased over 100 percent during the same 
period.89 The "loaded" minimum wage there comes to about $1.36 an hour. 
"Loaded" includes vouchers for groceries at the supermarket and company-paid 
contributions to the national health care system.90 The employment practices of 
the plants in Juarez make getting a job there relatively hard, and keeping it for a 
long period of time even more difficult. Two gendered subdivisions in the labor 
force exist due to the different hiring practices of electronics plants versus those 
of textile factories. Electronics workers must have relatively high levels of school-
ing, be young, single, childless, available for both morning and night shifts, and 
able to document a minimal period of six months of residence in Juarez.91 Tex-
tile factories, meanwhile, tend to employ workers who do not meet the criteria 
of the electronics plants, and therefore whose position in the local labor market 
is very weak. As a result, these women are more susceptible to exploitative con-
ditions and practices. Turnover in the maquiladoras is high because plants shut 
down or reduce production without notice; or workers will simply be fired for 
no reason other than to maintain a highly disciplined workforce. 
142 Tryon P. Woods 
The social dynamics of global commodity production are deeply gendered. 
Images of the border economy and culture have always been fused with repre-
sentations of sexual degeneracy, linking geographic with moral marginality. The 
rise of the representation of Tijuana, for instance, as a gigantic brothel at the 
service of the United States was made possible by a trajectory of economic and 
population growth that has gone hand in hand with activities that are stigmatized 
or prohibited in other places.92 Tijuana is degradingly feminized from both cen-
tral Mexico and the United States as a result of United States men crossing to 
purchase sex while Mexican men cross to the United States to sell their labor in 
the fields and cities. This discursive linkage points to how a margin always con-
verges with another margin, which by definition can be penetrated.93 National 
margins conspire with sex and gender margins, penetrated by economic inter-
ests. 
For many Mexicans, then, the border symbolizes the vulnerability of open-
ness. This openness is characterized not just by U.S. men in the Mexican 
bordertown cantinas, but also by the BIP and its overwhelming use of young 
Mexican female workers. The maquiladoras, representing the commodity ex-
change relationship of capitalism, come to symbolize prostitution.94 Thanks to 
this coupling, maquila workers have become targets for discursive and physical 
violence just as they have been targeted by U.S. multinationals for labor exploi-
tation. The female assembly-plant workers are thus violating traditional Mexi-
can cultural norms in at least two ways. First, the maquiladora's hiring practices, 
and the accompanying lack of viable employment for male workers in the Mexi-
can economy, have compelled thousands of women to break with cultural norms 
and become the primary wage-earner of their families. 
Second, in the patriarchal norm that maintains women should be indifferent 
to sex, the prostitute who has sex for money, a service she may find unpleasant 
but necessary, fits more easily into the patriarchal norm for female sexuality 
than the liberated woman who has sex for pleasure.95 Female assembly-plant 
workers are thus doubly associated with danger. They are disrupting economic 
and familial gender roles, and they are associated with degenerate sexual loose-
ness. These women have thus been constructed as a primary threat to Mexico's 
social and moral fabric—a paradoxical representation considering that the Mexi-
can government has bent over backwards to facilitate the profitability of U.S. 
multinationals operating in the country. 
Related to this constellation of representations is the violence against women 
that typifies much of the borderlands. Sexual violence is an especially over-
whelming feature of life in border towns like Juarez and Tijuana. In Juarez, 
according to government officials, at least 150 girls disappeared in the city dur-
ing 1995.96 At least 20 percent of these girls were maquila workers.97 When 
NAFTA went into effect in 1994, the homicide rate in Juarez skyrocketed to 
more than 54 deaths for every 100,000 people, five times the rate in Mexico 
City. This number includes 200 women killed since 1993, many of whom were 
victims of gruesome sex murders.98 
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The attorney general of Chihuahua, Mexico, stated in 1999 that, "It is im-
possible not to get wet when you go outside in the rain; it is also impossible for 
a woman to not get killed when she goes out alone at night."99 Esther Chavez 
Cano, an activist from Juarez, observes that this official discourse states that 
feminicide is bad, but homicide is worse. Many young women still "live" be-
cause they have not yet been found on the side of the rôad or dumped in the 
desert, but everyday they die because of economic, sexual, and racial violence, 
claims Cano. 10° She states that as consumers in the global market, these women 
are a debt that belongs to all of us. It is a debt that is borne with terrible disdain: 
Juarez produces millions of dollars in value-added goods and yet does not have 
a single battered women's shelter.101 As a place structurally dedicated to meet-
ing the needs of capitalist production, both the form of discursive violence that 
Cano is describing and the kind it is geared to dismiss (murder, rape, poverty) 
are central strategies of the crisis-state. This social violence entails a "fabrica-
tion of an entire space-time world—and the insinuation of its logic into the mun-
dane practices of human beings-as-citizen. Thus are subjects subjected to modes 
of social control that are rendered invisible in their very enactment."102 The fe-
male maquila workers become increasingly disposable precisely as they become 
integral to the border economy. 
The turbulence of the borderlands provides an uncensored view of the vio-
lent relations produced by the austerity and globalizing efforts of the crisis-state. 
The BIP represents the forces shaping the new geographies of globalization. 
The global economy is rooted in specific spaces and routed through concrete 
infrastructures. The movement of capital and people across national borders is 
part of a process of capital reinvestments and worker displacements within and 
across national spaces. The international boundary both divides national spaces 
and houses a distinct region. The border is less a line and more accurately a real 
place in which several incompatible, heterogeneous sites are juxtaposed. This 
meeting of heterogeneous spaces presupposes a system of opening/closing that 
both isolates and makes penetrable the physical locations and imagined identi-
ties of each side.103 The conditions of the political economy in the borderlands 
leaves many Mexicans with no option but to immigrate, to physically cross the 
border in search of a more viable life. 
The movement of capital and people across borders is constitutive of the 
construction of race and gender, the racial division of labor, and racially segre-
gated space, globally and locally. Again, as with the previously observed rela-
tionship between gentrifiers and the people displaced by gentrification, the con-
nection between U.S. workers and workers in the borderlands requires our at-
tention. The process of globalization must be understood as including both ideo-
logical and repressive expressions of the state's apparatus, as both symptomatic 
and determining of the relations of production. The conditions of global restruc-
turing exploit workers of color abroad and in the deindustrialized United States 
in ways that intensify the erosion of labor's position vis-a-vis capital and exacer-
144 Tryon P. Woods 
bate interracial conflicts. The perception that immigrants are taking jobs from 
U.S. workers heightens animosities that only end up maintaining the supremacy 
of whiteness and capital. Documentation is available to support the notion of a 
direct transfer of jobs from the U.S. labor market to Mexico or other off-shore 
locations;104 nevertheless, while the existence of inexpensive foreign labor com-
petition is real indeed, the phenomenon is overstated. The increase in second-
rate service sector jobs in the United States has less to do with immigration and 
global competition than with the release of workers from manufacturing and 
low rates of productivity growth in the service-sectors.105 Strikingly, the long-
term decline in U.S. wages began in the 1960s, well before any of the global 
labor markets became factors.106 
If simultaneous employment growth and deterioration in wages and job 
quality is not directly caused by immigration and off-shore production, then the 
issue is one of the crisis-state facilitating the reproduction of the relations of 
capital. Evidence from the borderlands demonstrates how capital accumulation 
benefits from differentiation. We can also see how the maintenance of white 
supremacy in the North American context benefits from gender domination. 
Employment practices in the maquiladoras rely upon the persistence of cultural 
norms for women even as they disrupt other normative gender roles in the fam-
ily and the community. The sexualized violence against women also serves to 
buttress that which it lashes out against: the restructuring of Mexican culture 
and political economy to accommodate the penetration of U.S. multinationals. 
Race, Gender, and Space: Towards an Account of 
Underdevelopment and Social Violence 
This discussion of the crisis-state and globalization leaves us with at least 
three critical considerations. First, the production of space takes up and repro-
duces the fluidity and contingency of race and gender hierarchies; second, the 
relationship between global capital production and social violence compels us 
to view the exploitation and displacement of workers in U.S. inner cities and in 
the U.S.-México borderlands as necessary parts of the same equation; and third, 
the global political economy, as a response to the crisis of capital, relies upon the 
management of race and gender difference to resolve the related crisis in liberal 
bourgeois democracy. 
To understand race, gender, and space within the global political economy, 
we must focus on the modalities of identity and commodity production, on "the 
process of making" within a labor market highly fractured along racial lines. 
The flexible accumulation capacities of the global economy simultaneously 
emanate from and take up the different expressions of racism and sexism. Rac-
ism undergirds narratives about "depressed" neighborhoods and the spatial threat 
of the inner city, thereby justifying the displacement practices of urban renewal. 
The gender and generation conflicts occurring in the Mexico borderlands as 
girls and young women are recruited for maquiladora jobs while their brothers, 
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husbands, and fathers have to scramble for work parallels the process in U.S. 
cities where black and Latino youths must compete with their own parents for 
employment at the same low-wage service jobs. In both places, underemploy-
ment and spatial displacement (from home, family, work, neighborhood, coun-
try) are mediated through state interventions in the global racial division of la-
bor. Global capitalism has been so lucrative for capital and for the crisis-state in 
part because of the availability of race and gender hierarchies. Speaking of the 
fluidity and contingency of these hierarchies means understanding difference as 
not a fixed essence but as the locus in which economic, gender, sex, and race 
contradictions converge. 
Workers and social spaces are less narrated by citizenship and geo-political 
boundaries, and more by histories of violence, segregation, immigration, and 
global economics. We need to consider the national relations of U.S. racial sub-
jects within an international context, while seeing the international history of 
the borderlands within a national context, and how both redefine each.107 The 
interaction between these contexts takes place as relations of dominance and 
subordination—a "complex unity, structured in dominance."108 In this complex 
structure, things are related as much through their differences as through their 
similarities. It is in this dialectical interaction that we can see the connection 
between the local and the global. 
Of critical importance for an analysis of globalization is the principle that 
development always has been uneven, occurring in different societies, cultures, 
and nations at different rates. Uneven development means that societies meet at 
different stages of their development. When two societies of different sorts come 
into contact, the rate and character of change already taking place is seriously 
affected to the extent that new patterns are created—namely, a relationship of 
dependency is entered in which the weaker of the two societies (i.e., the one 
with less economic capacity) is adversely affected and its development is trans-
formed to serve the development of the stronger society. Underdevelopment is 
therefore not the absence of development, but rather only makes sense in dialec-
tical relation to development. 
In addition to the comparative idea of underdevelopment, an even more 
indispensable component of this concept is that it points to a particular relation-
ship of exploitation.109 All of the "developed" nations directly or indirectly ex-
ploit the countries of the "underdeveloped" world. As the Guyanese scholar-
activist Walter Rodney explains: "In a way, underdevelopment is a paradox: Many 
parts of the world that are naturally rich are actually poor and parts that are not 
so well off in wealth of soil and sub-soil are enjoying the highest standards of 
living."110 The reasons for underdevelopment thus lie not within a society but in 
the relations between societies: unequal trade, direct ownership of the means of 
production by external entities, and foreign investment in the form of loans and 
"aid" to the governments of underdeveloped nations maintain relations of 
dominance and subordination. It is typical of underdeveloped economies 
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that they do not (or are not allowed to) concentrate on those sectors of the 
economy that in turn will generate growth and raise production to a new level 
altogether. In other words, while a country may increase its exports, thereby 
quantitatively raising its level of production, underdevelopment persists because 
the relations of exploitation hamper qualitative improvements in the different 
levels of the society. This situation includes the "brain drain" from Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, on the one (global) hand, and from the inner cities on the other 
(local) hand; it includes the absence of the educational, welfare, and distribu-
tional systems necessary to raise productive, qualified personnel (either in Af-
rica, central Mexico, or in South Central Los Angeles, for example); and it in-
cludes the tendency for whatever savings that are made within the underdevel-
oped economy to be mainly consumed or sent abroad (and often these two things 
are one-and-the-same given the extensive foreign investment in local consumer 
markets). 
By the same token, the standard of living of the developed capitalist coun-
tries owes not to its own internal resources, but rather to their exploitative prac-
tices with other nations. Dependency is thus established inversely proportional 
to a nation's natural resources. This dialectical interaction describes not only the 
underdevelopment of the so-called Third World in relation to the developed capi-
talist societies, but it also governs the relationship between inner cities and sub-
urbs and between the central cities and borderlands. Gentrification and border 
industrialization demonstrate this process. Suburbanization is constitutive of 
inner-city decline in a wider pattern of uneven development at the urban scale. 
Neil Smith explains the dialectics of this level of development: 
The investment of capital in the central and inner city caused 
a physical and economic barrier to further investment in that 
space. The movement of capital into suburban development 
led to a systematic dévalorisation of inner- and central-city 
capital, and this in turn, with the development of the rent gap, 
led to the creation of new investment opportunities in the in-
ner city precisely because an effective barrier to a new invest-
ment had previously operated there.111 
Smith is describing how the development of the suburbs was simultaneously the 
economic abandonment of the inner city, and how gentrification, as mentioned 
earlier, is a geographic reversal but an economic continuation of suburbanization. 
Furthermore, Smith draws our attention to how both the underdevelopment of 
the inner city and its later re-development through gentrification is spurred by 
falling profit rates. Gentrification is thus simultaneous to the sectoral shifts in 
capital investment that respond to the crises intrinsic to capitalist economic sys-
tems. For this reason, revitalizing cities is seen as integral to the overall revital-
ization of the economy. Since 1980, therefore, the governments of the United 
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States, United Kingdom, and most other advanced capitalist economies, have 
applied the same strategies to urban spaces as in other areas of the economy: 
state involvement in housing investment has been effectively withdrawn, creat-
ing a new climate of privatization in which gentrification has flourished.112 
Through the lens of underdevelopment we can see how the organiza-
tion and collective plunder of capitalism is simultaneously local and global. 
The economic relations of production must be reproduced, however, and 
this reproduction is never simply economic, but also is social, technical, 
and political. The economic may be the necessary but not the sufficient 
condition of any racially structured society.113 Capitalist social relations re-
quire elaborate development at the non-economic levels of politics, civil 
society, and culture. Racism, gender oppression, and spatial segregation are 
"practices which secure the hegemony of a dominant group over a series of 
subordinate ones, in such a way as to dominate the whole social formation 
in a form favorable to the long-term development of the economic produc-
tive base."114 In understanding how gentrification is an example of global 
restructuring touching down in local communities, we have to analyze the 
dialectical intercourse between and among relations that do not correspond 
but are over-determining on and for one another. 
I have suggested in this article that the crisis-state offers a productive frame-
work for understanding these articulations and their production of political sub-
jects structured in dominance, both in the inner cities and the borderlands. The 
profit crisis and the crisis of liberal democracy posed by race and gender in-
equality spurred the reconstitution of the capitalist state. The profitability prob-
lems of capital have led to a long corporate assault on labor, and managerial and 
government aggressions have contributed to the decline in real wages, job qual-
ity, and job security since the mid-1970s.115 The situation faced by labor prevails 
across international boundaries and points to the essential marker of the crisis-
state: the multi-faceted strategy to subordinate labor to resuscitate the profit rate. 
The list of strategies employed by the crisis-state include the weakening of 
labor protections and assets, the removal of social subsidies to the poor, lower 
taxes on the rich, selling off state companies and assets, deregulation of finan-
cial markets, re-regulation of intellectual property rights, reductions of tariffs 
and quotas on international trade, relaxation of child labor laws, downsizing 
and the emphasis on contingent work, the redirection of social resources from 
services such as education to policing, border patrol, and incarceration, and a 
variety of corporate subversions of workers' ability to organize and engage in 
collective bargaining.116 The downward pressure on wages is a product of 
capital's failure to reconcile its own contradictions; the deteriorating and in-
creasingly violent conditions, which workers in U.S. cities and in the border-
lands share in common, are thus the results of the crisis-state's efforts to re-
solve these contradictions. The conditions of possibility for capital accumula-
tion in both central cities and the borderlands also occupy the same ideological 
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seam: open the market and get rid of the artificial barriers and subsidies—in 
other words, eliminate welfare support and trade tariffs, erode working condi-
tions and undermine labor unions—and both workers and corporations will 
prosper.117 
An equally important component of the state's strategy is to harness race 
and gender difference to revitalize the profit rate. As we have seen, racialized 
workers inhabit the contradictions of liberalism's imagined universality, making 
race and gender into sites of contradiction between political emancipation and 
economic exploitation. The crisis-state attempts to recuperate the mobilizing 
power of race and gender difference that so threatens the liberal project. The 
deep divisions produced by racial and sexual exclusions are reduced to the issue 
of diversity in order to mystify social reality and distract from an actual engage-
ment with problems of discrimination, inequality, and social justice.118 The cri-
sis-state's use of diversity in this way actually creates homogeneity within each 
culture or ethnicity, fostering a community of separate homogeneous units. This 
homogenized notion of community presents difficult problems when it comes to 
questions of representation, authenticity, and other matters of import when at-
tempting to organize a collective voice of resistance.119 
The recuperation of difference operates by employing the language of 
multiculturalism 
to create strategies of "coping with differences" rather than 
taking steps toward a radical deepening of democracy. A re-
cuperative murticulturalism dissimulates the reality of eco-
nomic inequality, political and institutional discrimination, and 
cultural exclusion, which cuts across the basic social divisions 
of gender, "race," and class. The key discursive tactic is to 
denature and reduce exploitation, oppression, and domination 
to "respect for differences." She does Hanukkah, he does 
Kwanzaa; I like sushi, you like pizza. Create "diversity" and 
then homogenize it.120 
Globalization takes up this version of difference to further cover for the exten-
sion of inequality caused by economic restructuring. The result is that the spaces 
of globalization are not freely accessible like a public place.121 The rhetoric of 
liberalizing borders and freeing markets, suggesting a system of pure and simple 
openings, is a grand illusion. The new social formation created by the crisis-
state in fact hides serious exclusions. The old divisions are now simply reformu-
lated in ever tighter circuits of segregation: industry returns to the inner city only 
to constrain residents to low-wage service positions; it comes to the 
borderlands only to offer a standard of living unrecognizable in industrialized 
societies. 
Globalizing Social Violence 149 
Conclusion / A Question Forward 
We are left with the following problem: precisely what role does "place" 
have within an internationalist politics geared to resist the violence of the global 
political economic project? Understanding globalization through the connec-
tions surrounding the crisis-state suggests that the "place" of community is but a 
mere "site" where the circuits of living—much larger and intricate than their 
manifestation at that location—intersect.122 Our notions of identity, affiliation, 
authenticity, and authority are each challenged by this perspective. If place is but 
a momentary location within larger spatial circuits of power which are simulta-
neously national and transnational, then are we saying that the place of one's 
home and community is unimportant as a site of political struggle and mobiliza-
tion? If space is rifled through with such instability and incoherency, is it a vi-
able location of politics? Claims of spatial authenticity are often silenced as 
soon as they are voiced for precisely these concerns, because "geographical traces 
may play to the audience as the stigmata of relativism."123 Similarly, as is true 
about any static notion of racial belonging, spaces cannot restore coherency to a 
fragmented identity, "center the decentered subject," precisely because they are 
"sites of struggle which themselves are decentered, rendering the sort of identity 
formation that they engender always contingent."124 In other words, neither a 
space nor a race has a core essence to it, a measurably true and authentic poli-
tics; rather, the politics of space and race must always be constructed in each 
context. Therefore, a "return to place" as the basis for social movement says 
little about the political content of that movement. The formation of capitalist 
production is also contingent to the space of its organization. 
The answers to these questions may in fact be rather simple: no, home is not 
unimportant; and, yes, the local is a viable space for resistance. The difficulty, of 
course, lies in the how to. We would do well to work more on conceiving a 
spatial politics that understands location as multi-focal and inherently connected 
to but not reducible to direction, history, and identity. Such a politics would aim 
for clarity among competing claims to place by the uneven sensations of com-
modity flows and personal and collective agency.125 It also would make inroads 
against globalization's tendency to reinforce geo-political, racial, and sexual 
borders. 
Notes 
I have been fortunate to benefit from conversations on these issues with Cindy Bejarano, I 
David Goldberg, Thelma Foote, and George Lipsitz. I am also grateful to the editors of I 
American Studies, Cheryl Ragar, and the anonymous reviewers, for criticisms that were I 
instrumental in improving this piece. A portion of this research comes from work with 
the Corporation for Supportive Housing (NYC) and AIDS Housing of Washington. 
1. See Toni Negri, Revolution Retrieved: Writings on Marx, Keynes, Capitalist Crisis and 
New Social Subjects (London: Red Notes, 1988). For additional work using the crisis-state as 
point of departure, see Ruth Wilson Gilmore, "Globalisation and U.S. Prison Growth: From Mili-
tary Keynesianism to Post-Keynesian Militarism," Race & Class 40 (October-March 1998/99): 
171-188; and Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (New 
York: Verso, 1999). 
150 Tryon P. Woods 
2. The notion of "social violence" warrants more extensive deliberation than I have space 
for here. I can only briefly highlight the relevant components, including "the state," "force," and 
"justice." Jacques Derrida probes the difference between, on the one hand, force that can be just, 
or deemed legitimate, and on the other hand, the violence that one always deems unjust. Since, 
following Max Weber, the state claims a monopoly on force, I am interested in understanding 
social violence as justified authority, as an instance of both violence and legitimated power. By 
calling attention to the poverty, exploitation, and death produced by justified authority, the state 
and its superstructural components come into question. Derrida argues that we cannot address 
directly the problem of justice that the question of social violence always presupposes; justice is 
the always receding horizon. And yet grappling head-on with violence in its various incarnations 
is essential because the necessity of force is implied in "justice." As Derrida explains, justice is 
not justice, it is not achieved if it does not have the force to be "enforced"; a powerless justice is 
not justice. The account of "social violence" in this article takes up this implicit relationship, but 
a more complete treatment of the issue needs to contend with the origins of authority, to face the 
realization that, as Derrida states, the foundation or ground of the law cannot by definition rest on 
anything but itself, it is itself a violence without ground. See Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 
'Mystical Foundation of Authority'," in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla 
Cornell et al. (New York: Routledge, 1992), 3-67. 
3. My focus in this paper is on selective forms of social violence produced by globaliza-
tion. An important and constitutive form of violence in globalization that I will not be able to deal 
with here due to space limitations is that presented by the state's repressive forces, namely the 
police, military, and prisons. It should not go unobserved, however, that the coercive apparatus of 
the state is central to its political strategy of resolving the crises of capital and difference. In fact, 
the pervasive influence of the prison industry on all aspects of social, cultural, political, and eco-
nomic life demands analysis of globalization through the state's various modes of containment 
and surveillance. 
4. John L. Comaroff, "Reflections on the Colonial State, in South Africa and Elsewhere: 
Factions, Fragments, Facts, and Fictions," Social Identities 4 (October 1998): 6. 
5. Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: NLB, 1978), 
12. 
6. Ibid., 13. 
7. Ibid., 14. 
8. David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning (Cam-
bridge: Blackwell, 1993), 4. 
9. Etienne Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and 
After Marx (New York: Routledge, 1994), 58. 
10. Norma Alarcôn, Caren Kaplan, and Minoo Moallem, "Introduction: Between Woman 
and Nation," in Between Woman and Nation: Nationalisms, Transnational Feminisms, and the 
State, éd. Caplan, Alarcôn, and Moallem, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 2. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Gilmore, "Globalisation and U.S. Prison Growth," 176. 
13. Neil Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 77. 
14. Kitty Calavita, "The New Politics of Immigration: 'Balanced-Budget Conservatism' and 
the Symbolism of Proposition 187," Social Problems 43 (August 1996): 293. 
15. Gilmore, "Globalisation and U.S. Prison Growth," 177. 
16. Ibid., 177. 
17. Ibid., 178. 
18. Negri, Revolution Retrieved, 185. 
19. Ibid., 185. 
20. Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 206. 
21. During the ten-year period from 1984 to 1994, the state of California increased its De-
partment of Corrections personnel by 25,864 and built sixteen new prisons at a cost exceeding 
$10 billion, while higher education personnel dropped by 8,052 and the state built only one new 
campus of the California State University system and none for the University of California. Soci-
ologist Troy Duster observes that for the cost of imprisoning one person for one year, California 
could educate ten community college students, or five California State University students, or two 
University of California students. Duster notes that it was Victor Hugo who nearly 145 years ago 
said that every time we build a prison, we close a school. See Duster, "The New Crisis of Legiti-
macy in Controls, Prisons, and Legal Structures," The American Sociologist 26 (Spring 1995): 20-
29. On the parasitic relationship between prisons and social welfare see (among many others), 
Paula L. Dressel, " . . . and We Keep on Building Prisons: Racism, Poverty, and Challenges to the 
Welfare State," Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, 21 (September 1994): 7-29. And on the 
prison and policing industrial complex, see among others, Alexander C. Lichtenstein and Michael 
A. Kroll, The Fortress Economy: The Economic Role of the U.S. Prison System (Philadelphia: 
Globalizing Social Violence 151 
American Friends Service Committee, 1990), Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: Police and 
Prisons in the Age of Crisis (London: Verso, 1999), and Eric Schlosser, "The Prison-Industrial 
Complex," The Atlantic Monthly 282 (December 1998). 
22. Manning Marable, How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America (Boston: South End 
Press, 1983), 112. 
23. Bureau of Labor Statistics news release, August 9, 2000. U.S. Department of Labor 
website: http://stats.bls.gov/newsrels.htm. 
24. Calavita, "The New Politics of Immigration," 293. 
25. Rhonda A. Williams, "Accumulation as Evisceration: Urban Rebellion and the New 
Growth Dynamics," in Reading Rodney King, Reading Urban Uprising, ed. Robert Gooding-
Williams, (New York: Routledge, 1993), 91. 
26. See, for example, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Now is the 
Time: Places Left Behind in the New Economy (Washington, D.C.: HUD, 1999). 
27. Joel F. Handler, "Low-Wage Work 'As We Know It' : What's Wrong/What Can Be Done," 
in Hard Labor: Women and Work in the Post-Welfare Era, ed. Handler and Lucie White, (Armonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 3. 
28. Handler, "Low-Wage Work," 3. 
29. John E. Schwarz and Thomas J. Volgy, Forgotten Americans: 30 Million Working Poor 
in the Land of Opportunity (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 70. 
30. U.S. Census Bureau Statistics. Website: http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubsZp.60-
214.pdf. 
31. Williams, "Accumulation as Evisceration," 84; Handler, "Low-Wage Work," 4. 
32. Ibid., 84. 
33. Handler, "Low-Wage Work," 4. 
34. U.S. Census Bureau. Website: http://www.gOv/prod/2001pubs/p.60-214.pdf. 
35. National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach: The Gap Between Housing 
Costs and Income of Poor People in the United States (Washington, D.C.: NLIHC, 1999), 5; 
Handler, 4. 
36. Richard A. Walker, "Putting Capital in its Place: Globalization and the Prospects for 
Labor," working paper, Department of Geography, University of California at Berkeley, March 1, 
1999, http://geography.berkeley.edu/Publications/Global%201abor_2_5.html. 
37. National Priorities Project and Jobs with Justice. Working Hard, Earning Less: The Fu-
ture of Job Growth in America (NPP: Northhampton, Mass., 1998), n.p. The official poverty line 
in 1998 for a family of three was $12,750; for a family of four, the poverty line was $16,813. See 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/ww w/poverty.html for details. 
38. National Coalition for the Homeless, "Why Are People Homeless?" http:// 
www.nationalhomeless.org. 
39. Doug Henwood, "Clinton and the Austerity Cops," The Nation (November 23, 1992), 
628; cited in Philip T. Neisser and Sanford F. Schram, "Redoubling Denial: Industrial Welfare 
Policy Meets Postindustrial Poverty," Social Text 41 (Winter 1994): 44. 
40. Mishel, L., Bernstein, J., and Schmitt, J., The State of Working America: 1998-99 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute, 1999), n.p. 
41. The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines contingent workers as "persons who do not ex-
pect their jobs to last or who report that their jobs are temporary Contingent workers are those 
who do not have an implicit or explicit contract for ongoing employment. Persons who do not 
expect to continue in their jobs for personal reasons, such as retirement or returning to school, are 
not considered contingent workers, provided that they would have the option of continuing in the 
job were it not for these personal reasons." See "Contingent and Alternative Employment Ar-
rangements, February 2001," Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cpshome.htm. 
42. Handler and Hasenfeld, We the Poor People, 42. 
43. Stanley Aronowitz, The Politics of Identity: Class, Culture, Social Movements (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), 239. 
44. Goldberg, "Surplus Value," 211. 
45. Mark Greenberg, "Welfare Restructuring and Working-Poor Family Policy: The New 
Context," in Hard Labor, 35; S. Parrott, Welfare Recipients Who Find Jobs: What Do We Know 
About Their Employment and Earnings? (Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priori-
ties, November 1998). 
46. Robert J. Antonio and Alessandro Bonanno, "A New Global Capitalism? From 'Ameri-
canism and Fordism' to 'Americanization-Globalization,'" American Studies 41 (Summer/Fall 
2000), 38. 
47. Goldberg, Racist Culture, 9. 
48. George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from 
Identity Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 49. 
49. Norplant was originally developed by the Population Council, a nonprofit organization 
that promotes family planning in the Third World, and is now distributed in the United States by 
the pharmaceutical giant Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories. The drug's history is located at the intersec-
152 Tryon P. Woods 
tion of racial and reproductive politics. Norplant users document serious and debilitating side-
effects; removing it can be as dangerous as having it in place; and the coercion that has marked its 
distribution to poor black women in particular makes its relative permanence a seriously problem-
atic instance of domestic racial population control. See Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: 
Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: Vintage, 1997). 
50. Ibid., 244. 
51. Lawrence A. Herzog, Where North Meets South: Cities, Space, and Politics on the U.S.-
Mexico Border (Austin: Center for Mexican-American Studies, 1990), 83. 
52. Goldberg, "Surplus Value," 209. 
53. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 2000, Racial Statistics Branch. 
Website: http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/black/ppl-142/tab21 .txt. 
54. Goldberg, "Surplus Value," 210. 
55. Herzog, Where North Meets South, 82-83. 
56. People such as Neil Smith have made this point about frontier ideology shaping state 
action in urban areas more thoroughly and incisively. See Smith, "New City, New Frontier: The 
Lower East Side as Wild, Wild West," in Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and 
the End of Public Space, ed. Michael Sorkin (New York: Hill & Wang, 1992), 61-93. The work of 
Richard Slotkin is also rich regarding the role of frontier mythology in United States cultural 
history. See, for example, Slotkin, Fatal Environment (New York: Atheneum, 1985). 
57. Mike Davis, "The Infinite Game: Redeveloping Downtown L.A.," in Out of Site: A So-
cial Criticism of Architecture, ed. Diane Ghirardo (Seattle: Bay Press, 1991), 77. 
58. Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social 
Theory (London: Verso, 1989), 101. 
59. Smith, "New City, New Frontier," 83. 
60. Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness, 5. 
61. Ibid.,1. 
62. Smith, New Urban Frontier, 15. 
63. Smith, "New City, New Frontier," 87. 
64. Ibid., 89. 
65. Ibid. Smith notes that part of the government's response to the social fallout from the 
restructuring of urban space was to stop collecting this kind of data. 
66. Sheila Crowley, "The Affordable Housing Crisis," Poverty & Race (Poverty & Race 
Research Action Council) 11 (Jan/Feb 2002): 25. 
67. National Low-Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC), Out of Reach 2001: America's Grow-
ing Wage-Rent Disparity, n.p. Website: http://www.nlihc.org/oor2001. 
68. National Coalition for the Homeless, "Why Are People Homeless?" NCH Fact Sheet 
#1, May 1998. 
69. NLIHC, Out of Reach, 7. 
70. National Coalition for the Homeless, "Why Are People Homeless?" See U.S. Confer-
ence of Mayors, A Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness in America's Cities: 1998. 
71. Damaris Rose, "Rethinking Gentrification: Beyond the Uneven Development of Marx-
ist Urban Theory," Environment and Planning. D, Society and Space 1 (1984): 50, 56. 
72. Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place (University Park, Penn.: 
Pennsylvania State Press, 1990), 196. 
73. Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 
(New York: Cambridge, 1983). 
74. Rosalyn Deutsche, "Uneven Development: Public Art in New York City," in Out of Site, 
200. 
75. Robert A. Beauregard, Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), 323. 
76. Richard T. Ford, "The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis," in 
Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement, ed. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil 
Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, (New York: New Press, 1995), 451. 
77. Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, For We Are Sold, I and My People: Women and Industry 
in Mexico's Frontier (Albany: SUN Y Press, 1983), 26. 
78. Ibid., 29. 
79. Ibid., 30. 
80. Susan Tiano, Patriarchy on the Line: Labor, Gender, and Ideology in the Mexican Maquila 
Industry (Philadelphia: Temple, 1994), 27. 
81. Fernandez-Kelly, For We Are Sold, 27. 
82. Ibid., 32. 
83. Ibid., 45. 
84. Robert D. Manning and Anita Christina Butera, "Global Restructuring and U.S.-Mexi-
can Economic Integration: Rhetoric and Reality of Mexicn Immigration Five Years After NAFTA," 
American Studies 41 (Summer/Fall 2000): 200. 
85. Ibid. 
Globalizing Social Violence 153 
86. Kitty Krupat, "From War Zone to Free Trade Zone," in No Sweat: Fashion, Free Trade, 
and the Rights of Garment Workers, ed. Andrew Ross, (New York: Verso, 1997), 63. 
87. National Labor Committee, "An Appeal to Walt Disney," in No Sweat, 98. Workers in 
Haiti make products for the Disney Corporation. One worker will handle 375 Pocahontas shirts an 
hour, which will be sold at Wal-Mart for $10.97 each, and at the end of the week, her weekly wage 
will have totaled only $10.77. 
88. William M. Adler, "A Job on the Line," MotherJones (March/April 2000), 86. 
89. Charles Bowden, Juarez: Laboratory of Our Future (Hong Kong: Aperture, 1998), 76. 
90. Debbie Nathan, "Work, Sex, and Danger in Ciudad Juarez," NACLA: Report on the 
Americas 33 (November/December 1999), 25. 
91. Fernândez-Kelly, For We Are Sold, 105. 
92. Debra A. Castillo, Maria Gudelia Rangel Gomez, and Bonnie Delgado, "Border Lives: 
Prostitute Women in Tijuana," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 24 (Winter 1999): 
398. 
93. Nathan, "Work, Sex, and Danger," 28. 
94. Ibid., 28. 
95. Castillo et al., "Border Lives," 397. 
96. Bowden, Juarez, 76. 
97. Burials on the Border/Sepultadas en la Frontera: A Bilingual Conference on Women and 
Violence at the Millenium, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, N.M., October 1, 1999. 
98. Nathan, "Work, Sex, and Danger" 25. 
99. Arturo Gonzalez Rascon, Attorney General of Chihuahua, "Progress and Plans for the 
Future," at Burials on the Border/Sepultadas en la Frontera, October 1, 1999. 
100. Esther Chavez Cano, "Women and Violence," at Burials on the Border/Sepultadas en 
la Frontera, October 1, 1999. 
101. Ibid. 
102. Comaroff, "Reflections on the Colonial State," 9. 
103. Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," diacritics 16 (Spring 1986): 26. 
104. See, for example, Adler, "A Job on the Line." 
105. Walker, "Putting Capital In Its Place," 14. 
106. Ibid., 14. 
107. Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 1996), 34. 
108. Louis Althusser, quoted in Stuart Hall, "Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in 
Dominance," Black British Cultural Studies, ed. Houston Baker et al., (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 36. 
109. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C.: Howard Uni-
versity Press, 1982), 14. 
110. Ibid., 20. 
111. Smith, The New Urban Frontier, 85-86. 
112. Ibid., SI. 
113. Hall, 22-23. 
114. Ibid., 53. 
115. Walker, "Putting Capital In Its Place," 15. 
116. Ibid., 15-16. 
117. Alejandra Marchevsky and Jeanne Theoharis, "Welfare Reform, Globalization, and 
the Racialization of Entitlement," American Studies 41 (Summer/Fall 2000): 255. See Marchevsky 
and Theoharis for an analysis positing structural and ideological links between welfare reform in 
the U.S. and free trade legislation in North America. 
118. Minoo Moallem and Iain A. Boal, "Multicultural Nationalism and the Poetics of Inau-
guration," in Between Woman and Nation, 249. 
119. Ibid., 249. 
120. Ibid., 256. 
121. Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," 26. 
122. Roger Rouse, "Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Postmodernism," in Be-
tween Two Worlds: Mexican Immigrants in the United States, ed. David G. Gutierrez (Wilmington, 
Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1996): 257 
123. Keith, "Shouts of the Street: Identity and the Spaces of Authenticity," Social Identities, 
1,2 (1995), 308. 
124. Keith, "From Punishment to Discipline?" 208. 
125. Keith, "Shouts of the Street," 305-309. 
